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liberalization in a developing country. The welfare consequences of trade and
capital account liberalization under alternative sequencing scenarios are
investigated. We draw on standard trade theory results to show that the
opening of the capital account in the presence of trade distortions may be
welfare reducing if foreign borrowing is used to increase investment. However
we demonstrate that this welfare reducing effect of opening the capital
account will not occur if shadow prices are used to guide investment
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I.Introduction
For many years economists have argued that developing countries should
"liberalize" their economies. A number of empirical studies have suggested
that this liberalization process ——consistingof freeing domestic markets and
opening—up the economy to the rest of the world —willresult in higher rates
of growth and more equitable income distribution.' However, in spite of this
empirical evidence, and of the widespread beliefs among economists of the
merits of liberalizing LDCs economies, little serious efforts to that effect
have been taken by these countries. Many times liberalization attempts are
frustrated at different stages, with these economies reverting to inward—
looking developing strategies.
One of the ist important problems in the analysis of liberalization
reforms and of their failures refers to the dynamic aspects of these
processes. The characteristics of the transition between a repressed state
and a liberalized economy are not generally understood, and only recently
serious research efforts in this area have developed.2 Among these dynamic
aspects those related to the speed and order of liberalization are
particularly important. With respect to the former, the main question is how
fast an economy should be liberalized, i.e., cold—turkey vs. gradual
approaches. Regarding the order of liberalization the main question is what
are the welfare consequences of alternative sequencing scenario's (i.e., trade
liberalization while maintaining a closed capital account like Chile in the
late seventies or capital market liberalization while retaining trade
'See, for example, Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970); Krueger (1978,
1983); Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1978); Little (1982) and Balassa (1982, 1983).
20n the dynamics of liberalization see thegeneral discussion in Krueger
(1984). See also Khan and Zahier (1983), and Edwards (1983).2
barriers, as was the case in Argentina in the same period).
The purpose of the present paper is to addre8s some aspects of these two
problems —speedand order of liberalization. The analysis focuses on the
opening—up of the economy to the rest of the world, concentrating on the
liberalization of the current and capital accounts of the balance of
payments. We investigate the welfare consequences of trade and capital market
liberalization processes under alternative sequencing scenarios. The analysis
assumes that the simultaneous and instantaneous opening of both accounts of
the balance of payments is not considered as a policy option. The recent
experience of a group of countries in Latin America is in fact one of partial
(i.e., one market only) liberalization. While in Argentina the capital ccount
was liberalized, the trade account retained its controls. In Chile the
opposite was the case. Moreover, historically trade liberalization has often
been implemented during periods of severe constraints on external borrowing
(e.g., the IMF routinely pushes for trade liberalization as part of its
"rescue programs").
We draw on standard trade theory results to show that the opening of the
capital account in the presence of trade distortions may be welfare reducing,
if foreign borrowing is used to increase Investment and investment decisions
are made using domestic market prices, cautioning against following this
sequence. However, we demonstrate that this welfare reducing effect of open-
ing the capital account will not occur if shadow prices are used to guide
Investment decisions for the new capital goods brought in. We also demon-
strate that the welfare costs of capital market restrictions are increased if
they fall disproportionally on Investment as opposed to consumption. This is
empirically an important case. We then show that under such circumstances
gradual reduction of tariffs is superior to an abrupt liberalization.3
The paper is organized in two parts. In Section 2 a one period model is
developed and some preliminaries are presented. The analysis in this section
is carried out in terms of welfare effects of tansfers and factor movements
from abroad, and previous results by Johnson (1967), Bertrand and Flatters
(1971), Brecher and Diaz—Alejandro (1977), Grossman (1983) and van Wijnbergen
(1983a) are summarized and discussed. This analysis is useful for the
investigation of the effect of liberalizing the capital account presented in
the following section. The reason for this is that the effects of opening of
the capital account can be viewed as the combination of a positive transfer
today, plus a (larger) negative transfer tomorrow. In this section we point
out that the distinction between transfers in the form of consumption goods
and transfer in the form of capital (i.e., machinery) is critical for the
welfare analysis. The crucial role of shadow prices in the investment process
is also discussed.
In Section 3 a two—period model Is developed and the welfare effects of
reducing import tariffs in an economy with capital market distortions are
analyzed. Here our argument for a gradual trade liberalization in an economy
where the capital market distortions fall disproportionately on investment is
fully developed. Finally in Section 4 some concluding remarks are presented,
and the policy implications of our analysis are discussed.
2. Welfare Effects of Transfers and Foreign Investment in a One—Period
Framework
In this section we develop a simple one—period model of a small open
economy to analyze the effects of transfers and direct investment on
welfare. Regarding transfers, we consider two possible forms in which these
can be made: in the form of consumption goods and in the form of capital4
(i.e., machines).3 Since this analysis is based on a one—period model, it
cannot really deal with issues of borrowing in the international capital
market. However, moSt of the issues that arise in a two—period model with
foreign borrowing and lending are already present in the single—period
analysis with exogenous transfers presented here [see Edwards 19831. The
reason for this is that the effect of opening the capital account can be
viewed as a positive transfer today (when a foreign loan is obtained), plus a
larger negative transfer tomorrow when the foreign loan is repaid, if the
capital market distortion takes the form of a quantity constraint on foreign
borrowing.
We first look at the effects of a transfer in the form of capital (i.e.,
the donor ships machines to the recipient country) on the recipient country's
welfare. The analysis is developed for the case of a small country with two
goods, whose importable is assumed to be capital intensive.4 The country in
question uses convex technology that can be described by a twice differenti-
able convex revenue function. Similarly, consumer preferences will be sum-
marized by a twice differentiable concave expenditure function. [See Dixit
and Norman (1980) for a discussion of the properties of revenue and expendi-
ture functions. ITheeconomy is distorted by production subsidies and
consumption taxes on the importable good. The model is given by equations (1)
through (4):
R(l,q;K,L) + C E(1,p;U) (1)
31n their well—known textbook Caves and Jones (1981, Ch. 4) make a
distinction between these two possible forms of making a transfer.










q: domestic producer's price of commodity two relative to commodity
K: stock of capital
L: total labor available in the economy
p*: world price of commodity two relative to commodity one
: consumption tax on good two
a:production subsidy on good two
E =..!: compensateddemand for good two
p ap
Rq =:
supply function for good two
C: government (net) revenue from taxation
Equation (1) is the budget constraint for a distorted economy, where G
equals net government revenue. Good one is taken to be the numeraire
commodity, and it is assumed that this country imports good two, so that
(E —Rq)> 0. Notice that in the case of a tariffcx =B.The effect of a
transfer in the form of capital on welfare can be found by totally
differentiating (1), and using (2) through (4):
au(RKaRK) —= q
(5) dK E(l —BCE)6
where the subindex refers to a partial derivative with respect to that
particular variable. CE captures the pure income effect of a change in
expenditure on good 2; 0 < PCE < 1 if both goods are normal. Therefore,
(1 —C)is positive but smaller than one.5 RK is the marginal product-
ivity of capital and RqK is the Rybczynski term,whichwill be positive if
good two (the importable) is capital intensive as we have assumed. The
denominator of this expression is positive; however, the numerator can be
either positive or negative, depending on whether RKcZRK.Itfollows that




This result, of course, is the one obtained by Johnson in his classical
1967 article on capital accumulation in the presence oftariffs.6 If the
transfer results in an intensification of the preexisting distortion welfare
-
maybe reduced.
The above discussion assumes capital is accumulated as a result of a
transfer from abroad, which is made in the forms of machines. Brecher and
Diaz—Alejandro (1977) have analyzed an alternative case where capital
accumulation occurs due to foreign investment. This case differs from the
previous one in that now foreign investors will take their profits out of the
domestic country. In this case the budget constraint (equation (1)), is
written in the following form:
5mederivationof (5) uses the identity CE E.
6See also Bertand and Flatters (1971).7
R(l,q,K+ dK,L) + C —H=E(l,p,U) (7)
where H are profits remitted to the foreign country, and will be given by
H =pdKwhere p is the rate of profit obtained by the foreign investor.
The change in welfare is now equal to:
dU-- qK—E(l—C ) (8)
U F:
If the rate of profits obtained by foreign investors is equal to the




This means that if foreign investors repatriate the full rental rate, under
the assumption that the importable good is capital—intensive (i.e.,
RqK > 0) welfare will always decrease as a result of foreign investment.
This result is independent of the relationship between czRqK and RK. This
is exactly the Brecher—Diaz Alejandro (1977) result. If, however, the return
to foreign investment is taxed, it is possible that foreign investment will be
welfare improving. The tax required for this to be accomplished has to exceed
qK' and could conceivably drive the after tax rate of return to foreigners
below their alternative rate of return r*, and so become prohibitive, a
point made by Grossman (1983) and van Wijnbergen (1983a).8
Consider the case where the country obtains a transfer that has to be
used for consumption.7 In this case equation (1) becomes:
R(l,q;K,L) + G + TE(1,p;U) (10)
where T is the transfer. Totally differentiating (10) we obtain:
>0 11 dT E(l_CE)
which is always greater than zero: a transfer made in the form of consumption
goods, can never be welfare worsening. (We are ignoring "induced" distortions
a la Brecher—Bhagwati (1982) and transfer induced changes in the world
relative price vector).
In the presence of distorted trade, then, a transfer in the form of
capital (i.e., machines) may be welfare worsening; while a consumption
transfer will always be welfare improving. This suggests that if a transfer
is given partially in terms of consumption goods and partially in terms of
capital, a reduction in welfare in the recipient country could result even
under stability (which is assured by the small country assumption). This kind
of immiserizing transfer is similar to the distortion—induced transfers ana—
lyzed by Brecher and Bhagwati (1982). The relevance of this case ——wherethe
transfer is made in capital and goods ——stemsfrom the fact that in the real
world it is common to find aid which is given on the condition that part of
the resources are used for investment (i.e., to increase the capital stock).
Should we therefore conclude that foreign aid channeled into investment
(typical World Bank practice) has dubious welfare effects in distorted
71n Section 3 we will endogenize both size and use of the transfer.9
economies, while consumption out of aid is to be encouraged? Clearly this is
much too sweeping a statement to be true. In fact, we will show that the
immiserizing effects of capital transfers can be eliminated completely by
using shadow prices to guide the sectoral allocation of, and technology choice
incorporated in, the influx of capital goods.
Consider again our two—sector economy. In order to simplify the
exposition we now assume that == r,so that p =q=(p+ r). We
already showed that introducing a gift (i.e., transfer) of machines could be
welfare derteriorating if allocation and technology choice are governed by the
relative price vector (l,q) which can be represented by adding it to K in
the argument list of R. However, deciding on allocation and technology
choice using world prices (l,p*), which clearly are the appropriate shadow
prices in this context, leads to different results. This can be modelled by
introducing a separate revenue function summarizing the optimal allocation of
labor use (L) of the new machines by the Shadow Pricing Agency (note that we
have CRT technology). Of course, labor use on new machines means less labor
available for old machines: the shadow wage rate is positive. Choosing L
is clearly equivalent to setting a shadow wage rate. All this boils down to
the following structure:
R(l,q;K,L —t) +T(Eq —Rq)
+ R(l,p*;K*,L) E(l,q,U) (12)
where is the capital transfer. We assume that output is actually sold at
market prices so that if protected goods were to be produced with the new
capital goods, the tariff revenue replacement effect exactly cancels that part
of total revenues represented by the excess of market price q of over
justifying our use of (l,p*) which omits that component, and the absence of
TR in the tariff revenue term. It is possible moreover that R=0,we
p*10
do not impose incomplete specialization on the Shadow Pricing Agency.
Differentiating (12) we obtain:
(_RL + + TRqL) dt + LdK*EUdU
(13)
Optimally choosing L implies setting 0which yields the intuitively
dL






This means that the shadow wage rate RL is above orbelow the market wage
depending on whether the Rybczynski term RqLis negative or positive. In
our example q is the price of the capital—intensivegood, 80 RqL < 0 and
the shadow wage is above the market wage. This makes sense: protectingthe
capital intensive sector leads to overproductionof the capital intensive
good; to reconcile that with a fixed aggregate capitallabor ratio, overly
labor intensive techniques in any given sector have tobe chosen so that the
market wage is below the wage that would obtain in the absenceof relative
price distortions.
Inserting (14) into (13) immediately gives theresult that with shadow
pricing immiserization is ruled out:
(15)
dL dK
3. Trade and Capital Market Liberalization in aTwo—Periods World
The static framework of the previous section is not really asatisfactory
framework for the analysis of capital market distortions. Capitalmarket11
distortions are in a sense isomorphic to trade distortions, in that they
involve barriers to trade between goods today and goods tomorrow, in the same
way that trade barriers interfere with trade in different goods at any moment
of time. Accordingly, an intertemporal framework is appropriate.
In this section we develop a simple two period model, similar to the one
in van Wijnbergen (1984), and use it to derive expressions for the welfare
costs of capital market distortions. In particular we analyze quantity
constraints in international capital markets under various rationing
mechanisms.
We then extend the model to a two—commodity per period setting in order
to analyze trade liberalization under external balance constraints,
empirically a very important case.
We draw on recent work on the relation between temporary tariffs and
private savings [i.e., Razin and Svensson (1983) and van Wijnbergen (1983b)]
to analyze the question of cold turkey versus gradualism in trade liberaliza—
tion in the case where external rationing falls disportionately on investment.
We unambiguously establish that under those circumstances gradualism Is the
optimal strategy.
3.1 The Welfare Costs of External Capital Market Constraints.
Consider a simple two period—one sector open economy with endogenous
investment. Assume first that there are no capital market distortions so that
the domestic discount factor 6 (one over one plus the interest rate) equals
* *
theworld discount factor 6 ,(i.e.,6 6 ).Themodel can be summarized
by the intertemporal budget constraint with savings and production decisions
already solved via the use of revenue and expenditure functions:
L) + 6* R2(K ÷I,L) —I=E(1,6*; W) (16)12
where 6 is the world discount factor [6*1/(1 + r*)1, or the price of
future goods in terms of today's goods. R1 refers to the revenue function in
period 1, while R2 is the revenue function in period 2. E, on the other
hand, is the intertemporal aggregate expenditure function, and gives the mini-
mum discounted value of expenditure required to achieve the level of welfare
W, given the discount factor 6. Investment (I) is determined by value
maximization of the firm, which leads to an equivalent of "Tobin's q" being
set equal to one:




—* 2> 0 (17a)
6
If there is a binding external borrowing constraint the current account
deficit in period one will be equal to the constant
CA1 =—T• (18)
The unconstrained first period deficit would have been larger
(CA1 =— T< —T)where "'"indicatesa variable from the unconstraint
solution. The optimal policy response is clearly to charge a cost of foreign
borrowing r above the world rate of interestr* to consumers and investors
alike. A convenient way of parametrizing this is to assume there is a tax on




b(r —r*)/((1+ r) (1 + r*)), the discounted value of tax payments per13
unit repaid. Equation (16) then becomes
R1(K, L) + 6 R2(K + I, L) + b (R2 —E6)
—1(6)=E(1,6, W) (20)
where6 is determined by the requirement
—
E6) (21)
or the future surplus discounted at the world rate of interest should equal
the maximum allowable deficit today.
Equation (19) simply says that to satisfy the external balance
constraint, future goods should be made cheaper in terms of current goods so
that people will willingly shift expenditure towards tomorrow. Expression
(21) indicates that this process should continue until the constraint just
ceases to be binding. Differentiation of (20) gives us the expression for the
welfare effects of a change In 6 (because of a change in T):
(6 6) + R 161 d6 =
EWdW (22)
Integration then yields the approximate total welfare gain8 to be
expected from such an increase in T that 6 will equal 5* where the
constraint just ceases to be binding:
Ew
=1(* —6)2(E66 + R.I6) (23)
Since homogeneity of compensated demand functions implies E66 =—




8Approximate because we assumeE66 and 16 to be constant when
performing the integration.14
where we used the fact that $5 =1
So the cost of the distortion, In familiar Harberger fashion, is
proportional to (compensated) savings and investment elasticities and to the
*
squareof the equivalent price wedge 5 —6introduced by the distortion.
An alternative way of writing (23) may be useful for empirical work; note that





—6 •Therefore(23) can be written as
E —1(* —)2CA'
$5 5• (23b)
Equation(23) gives the social cost of the externally imposed constraint
on the current account if the optimal policy response is followed.In prac-
tice however rationing often falls disproportionately on investment rather
than consumption. It is easily demonstrated that in that case the social loss
caused by the constraint Is larger.
Since we will use this rationing nchanisrn below it is useful to
elaborate on this point. We will assume, without loss of generality, that
only investment is rationed. If we make the simplifying assumptionthat tax
revenues are handed back to the public in the period where they are levied,
the model with only investment rationed becomes
R1(K, L) + $5* R2(K + I(), L) —I()=E(1,$5*,W) (24a)
.R2(K+ I,L) =1 (24b)




where is the inverse of one plus the market clearing rate of interest
under this rationing mechanism.
Comparing (24c) with (21) yields, after linearization:
*
* 1 + E16/I > 1 (25)
for positive savings elasticities. Since the distortionary costsare
proportional to the square of the price wedge, (25) indicates that the
investment rationing scheme leads to larger welfare losses, This rationing
scheme however may be the only feasible one available. In the next sectionwe
draw on some recent work on the impact of temporary tariffs on theconsumption
rate of interest and private savings to construct an argument for gradual
trade liberalization under such circumstances.
3.2 Trade Reform Under an External Balance Constraint: A Second Best
Argument for Gradualism
Consider an extension to two goods of the model of Section 3.1, wIth an
external balance constraint falling on investment only. We will exploit the
link between temporary tariffs and private savings via the consumption rate of
interest stressed by Razin and Svensson (1983) and van Wijnbergen (l983b) to
construct an argument for gradualism in liberalizing trade.
Cold turkey liberalization implies that the pre—liberalization tariffT
is lowered to zero in both periods. Gradualism implies a zero tariff in
period 2 but a lower but positive tariff in period one (T** in Figure
1). The differential welfare effect can accordingly be obtained by evaluating
the welfare effect of a tariff in period one under the assumption of a
zero tariff in period two.
To do so we of course have to extend the model to at least two traded
goods Cx and y) each period. By choice of normalization assume thatrAXL.
16







good x is the untaxed commodity. The budget constraint then becomes
R1(1,p1;K) + 6* R2(l,p2;K+I) —1(6)+ t(E—R1)=
y y P' P1
y y
E(111(1,p'),6*]12;W) (26)
where p1, the domestic price of good y in period one, equals the world
price plus tariff rate, P =P+ r. We assume that aggregate utility W Is
y
weakly homothetically identically separable, which allows us to write the
expenditure function as a function of within period price indices rti(l,P1)
i =1,2,the discount factor 6* and welfare W (see Svensson and Razin
(1983)).




Investment is determined by setting the value of capital (evaluated at
the "virtual discount factor"6, since investment is rationed) equal to its
reproduction costs:9
6R =1, (28)
where we made the simplifying assumption that investment goods consist of good
one only, or, alternatively, that the good—2 components can be imported free
of tariffs.
9The concept of "virtual prices" at which rationsare willingly consumed
is Introduced by Neary and Roberts (1980).18
Simple differentiation of (26) and (27) and inserting (28) give us
''= 1(1—
TC1)1I2ll11o*E1111]+ [C2E T(E11 —R111fl (29)
(A) (B)
is a positive constant (see the Appendix for explicitformulas).
C2E =E El, the marginal propensity to spend (on all goods) in period
two. Equation (29) tells us that asmall tariff will increase5, or lower
the interest rate that has to be charged to investorsin order to hit the
capital market constraint.
The mechanism is clear: a small tariff decreasesthe consumption
discount factor or, equivalently, increases the ConsumptionRate of
)
Interest.This leads thigherprivate savings, leaving more room for
investment given the external current account constraint.Accordingly, cS
can go up, closer to the world marketdiscount factor 6. The effect
corresponds to term (A) in (29). If howeverthe tariff is too large, term
(B), which is proportional tor, will dominate and reverse theresult.
The reason is once again clear: a large first periodtariff will inflict
a large first period real income loss;consumption smoothing will then lead to
downward pressure on the firBt period current account.If the real income
loss is large enough this effect will offset the positiveeffect via the
CR1. Define as the tariff rate where these two effectswill just cancel
each other out in the margin.
We are now ready to look at the welfare effectsof a small first period
tariff under the external balance constraint with investmentrationing:
2 E11(6*_6) + (E11 -R111)
(30)
(+;C) (—;D)19
where > 0 (see the Appendix for a precise expression).Equation (30)
backs up our claim in the introduction to thissection: a first period
tariff, if not too large, is welfare improving under the externalbalance
constraint—cum—investment_ratjonlng mechanism considered. The firstterm,
C, is proportional to the size of the capital market distortion (*t5)and
the compensated sensitivity of savings withrespect to the rate of interest
(E11
)andis positive. A temporary tariff will raise theconsumption rate 21
of interest, increasing private savings, thereforeleaving more room for pri-
vate investment (which was too low because of the external balanceconstraint
and the rationing mechanism adopted) and so reduces thedistortionary costs of
the external balance constraint—cum—investment—ratjonjng.
If the first period tariff is too large however, the secondterm, D,
will increase since it is proportional tor. In that case the static welfare
losses because of the first period relative price distortionmay offset the
**
dynamic gains via the CR1. Define t as the rate where these effects
** * cancel on the margin. It is straightforward to show thatr < T ,I.e.,
the marginal welfare effect flips sign as t increases beforethe effect on
5 is reversed (cf., the Appendix).
Setting the marginal net welfare gain of a first period tariffequal to
zero implicitly defines the (second best) optimal first period tariff:
T
ll2II1
E (*)/( -R1 )>0 (31) P 2l PP PP
y yyyy
(31) shows that under the investment rationing schemeadopted in response to
the external balance constraint, the first period (secondbest) optimal tariff
is 8trictly positive. This establishes the superiority ofgradualism over
cold turkey liberalization under the external balanceconstraint—cum—20
investment—rationing.
To recapitulate, we start off by analyzing the very realistic (for most
LDC's) case where an exogenously imposed external balance constraint fell
disproportionately on investment rather than on consumption (in fact we
assumed, for analytical convenience, that it fell completely on investment;
this is immaterial however). Under those circumstances a small first period
tariff was shown to be welfare improving because of its favorable effects on
private savings (via the CR1) and the ensuing relaxation of the rationing of
private investment. Since gradual trade liberalization can be considered as
complete liberalization with a small tariff put back on in period 1, this
constitutes an argument for gradualism when liberalizing trade under external
balance constraints.
It should be emphasized however that this is conditional on investment
taking a disproportionate share of the adjustment burden to the external
constraint; if a market clearing real interest rate above world levels can be
charged to consumers and Investors alike, it can be shown that the argument
for additional first period relative price distortions via temporary tariffs
disappears, the favorable CR1 effects notwithstandirLg)° However in most
LDC's such a first best rationing device is typically unavailable, so that
our argument for gradualism stands.
4. Concluding Remarks
In a first best world without externalities, market imperfections and
without constraints on commodity taxation the issues addressed in this paper
——howto liberalize trade in factors and goods, is of no interest:
'°A proof of this statement is available on request from the authors.21
instantaneous complete liberalization will always be optimal for a country too
small to influence the world relative price vector. However capital market
liberalization may be considered while political, distributional or revenue
considerations bar instantaneous trade liberalization; alternatively, trade
liberalization may be chosen (or imposed) while external constraints prevent
foreign borrowing. The recent experience of a group of countries in South
America is one of partial (i.e., one market only) liberalization. While in
Argentina the capital account was liberalized, the trade account retained its
controls. In Chile the opposite was the case.
In this paper we discuss the consequences of these two alternative
sequences of liberalization. We first review the literature on immiserizing
transfers, extending it in several respects. We discuss immiserizing capital
transfers a la Johnson (1967) and capital inflows a la Brecher—Alejandro
(1977) and show that immiserization is possible even if the full rental rate
differential is taxed. We then show that a transfer in the form of consump-
tion goods will never be welfare reducing. Aninterestingconsequence is that
foreign aid that stipulates that at least part of the transwer has to be
invested can be immiserizing while aid that is purely consumed cannot (in the
small country case). So it is possible to have immiserlzation, if liberallz—
ing capital market leads to more investment (as it will If the external
balance constraint fell on both consumers and investors alike), It is
straightforward to show that the private sector will invest both too much and
in the wrong sector if tariffs protect the capital intensive sector. We
demonstrate that shadow pricing of new investment projects, would avoid that.
If, however, Imposing the use of shadow prices on the private sector in evalu-
ating new projects is infeasible, opening up capital markets while restricting
trade could lead to immiserization, cautioning against this sequence.22
Capital market distortions are in a sense isomorphic to trade distortions
in that they imply barriers to trade in goods across time rather than between
countries at a given moment in time; accordingly, one needs an interteniporal
framework for a satisfactory analysis of the welfare cost of capital market
constraints. This is provided in Section 3 of this paper.
We derive a simple expression linking the cost of capital market
distortions to the square of the induced interest rate differential and the
(compensated) interest elasticity of savings and investment. The same
procedure is used to demonstrate the increase in distortionary costif
external rationing falls disproportionately on investment, empirically a vey
important case.
We finally draw on recent work on the relation between temporarytariffs
and private savings via the consumption rate of interest to analyze the
question of cold turkey vs. gradualism in tradeliberalization in the case
where external rationing falls disproportionately on investment, andestablish
unambiguously that under those circumstances gradualism isthe optimal
strategy. Most examples of trade liberalizationtook place under external
balance constraints; in most cases of external balance constraintsinvestment
takes a disproportionate share of the adjustment burden; so this conclusion is
of great policy relevance.23
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APPENDIX




I PyPy =1 I * (A.l)
C2E
_6*4Id I-211
dTI 2l I py
F
The determinant of the matrIx on the LHS equals:
*2 * 2 =
—(l—tC1)
S + C2E(I5 —5)
C-) (+)
which appears of indeterminate sign. However some manipulationyields
=
_(l_C2E)5*4— C2+ rC15 4 (A.2)
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(3. _.L...) P1C xld5 RK_C2E_ ,l yly
y
where we used P1C + P1C + C2E1 and &k4 = 1. xldylf
Cramer's rule applied to (A.l) now gives




which is expression (29) in the text with y =—26
The expression for becomes
Ew
= -[IIIIE11(6-6)
+ t(E11 —R111fl (A.4)
which is expression (30) in the text with
= —L6*2Re
Setting (A.3) to zero to derive and (A.4) to zero to derive T
yields:
** * T =QT —
withn = C2 < 1,
112111





Finally A.4 immediately shows that T> 0, so that the claim made ins
the text is in fact true:
** * 0<T <t.
111n claiming > 0 we assumed 1 —(r/p)(S*PC1/&)
> 0. This is a
reasonable assumption: 'r/p < 1 by constructionand (6*pC1f/5) < 1 even
for severe capital market distortionsunder plausible import shares. The
**
important result T> 0 does not depend on that assumption.